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6. Other Related Issues Which Are (Arguably) Not Part of Ethics Proper .................................................... 33
1. Types of Realism

- **Types of Realism:**
  - **Objective:** Independent of the subjective states of individual.
  - **Intersubjective:** Based upon the subjective states of a group of people, even an entire species.
  - **Subjective:** Based upon the subjective states of an individual.
1.1. Two Kinds of Objectivity

- **Objectivity**:
  - **Ontological Objectivity**: A claim is *ontologically* objective just in case the claim is true by virtue of correspondence to an objective entity or property.
    - Example: The sentence “Murder is wrong” is true *because* there is a real property, *wrongness*, and all moral acts that result in murder have that property. Moreover, all murders would have this property even if no one contemplated the moral status of murder and even if everyone thought that murder did not have such a property.
  - **Epistemological Objectivity**: A claim is *epistemologically* objective just in case the claim would be believed by an impartial or rational person who considered it. *Note*: An epistemologically objective claim might or might not also be ontologically objective.
    - Example: The sentence “Murder is wrong” is true *because* if there were an Ideal Observer—a person who is omniscient with respect to nonethical facts, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, and normal in other respects—would contemplate murder with a feeling of disapproval. ¹

2. Branches of Ethics

- **Moral Theory:**
  - **Normative Ethics:** The study of what is morally good or bad, what is morally right or wrong, what morally ought or ought not to be done, and so forth.
  - **Meta-Ethics:** The study of the nature of status of normative ethical claims, beliefs, and theories.\(^2\)
  - **Applied Ethics:** The study of particular issues that are matters of moral judgment.
  - **Descriptive Ethics:** The study of people’s beliefs about morality. It’s probably inaccurate to categorize descriptive ethics as a part of moral theory, but I threw it in here for lack of a better place to put it.

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2.1. Meta-Ethics

- **Meta-Ethics**: The study of theoretical definitions of morality.
  - **Definitions of Morality**: The study of theoretical definitions of morality.
  - **Deontic Logic**: The study of forms of argument or inference or reasoning that depend on the normative and evaluative terms in normative ethical claims.\(^3\)
  - **Moral Linguistics**: The study of (a) the meaning of moral sentences; and (b) of moral speech acts and effects.\(^4\)
  - **Moral Ontology**: The study of whether any moral properties and facts exist and, if so, what metaphysical status they have.
  - **Moral Epistemology**: The study of whether, when, and how substantive moral claims and beliefs can be justified or known.\(^5\)
  - **Moral Psychology**: The study of the nature and sources of moral beliefs and moral emotions, such as guilt and shame, as well as about our motivation to be moral.\(^6\)

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\(^3\) Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, 6.


2.1.1. Moral Ontology

- **Moral Ontology:**
  - **Moral Anti-Reductionism (a/k/a ‘non-naturalism’):** The position that moral facts and properties are not reducible to non-moral facts and properties. The standard label for this position is the rather unfortunate and undescrptive term ‘non-naturalism.’ I have coined the new term, “moral anti-reductionism,” to be more clear. (Moore, Fales, Wielenberg)
  - **Moral Reductionism:**
    - **Reductive Moral Naturalism:** Moral facts and properties are reducible to natural, non-moral facts and properties. (Brink, Swinburne)
    - **Reductive Moral Supernaturalism:** Moral facts and properties are reducible to supernatural, non-moral facts and properties. (Adams)
2.2. Substantive Ethics

- Substantive Ethics:
  - **Consequentialism**: The rightness or wrongness of action depends on its consequences.
    - **Egoism**: The rightness or wrongness of action depends on its consequences *for the individual*.
    - **Utilitarianism**: The rightness or wrongness of action depends on its consequences *for everyone*.
  - **Non-Consequentialism**: The rightness or wrongness of an action does not depend on its consequences.
    - **Kantianism**: The rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the action’s adherence to a rule or rules.\(^7\) *Rational will* (the categorical imperative) gives us the moral law.
    - **Social Contract Theory**: *Necessary agreement* gives us the moral law.

- **Normative Divine Command Theory**: God’s commands give us the moral law.  

- **Virtue Ethics**: Unlike the previous three theories which are focused on *doing*, virtue ethics is focused on *being*, viz., the virtues or characteristics of a moral person.  

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9 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue_ethics
2.3. Applied Ethics

- **Applied Ethics**: the list below is far from comprehensive; it is provided for illustration only.
  - War
  - Capital Punishment
  - Euthanasia
  - Abortion
  - Animal Rights
3. Moral Concepts

- **Value (Axiological) Concepts**: Categories include positive (value), neutral (indifferent), and negative (disvalue).
- **Duty (Deontic) Concepts**: Examples include required/obligatory, permitted, and prohibited/forbidden.
- **Virtue Concepts**: Categories include positive characteristics (virtues) and negative characteristics (vices). Examples of virtues might include courage, justice, and patience. Examples of vices might include cowardice, injustice, and impatience.
4. Axiology

- **Axiology**: The study of values and comprehensive value theory.
  - **Definition of Value**:
  - **Relationship of Value to Others**: intrinsic vs. extrinsic value
  - **Nature of the Benefit at Issue**:
  - **Relationship to Morality**:
4.1. Definition of Value

- **Louis Pojman’s definition:**
  - **Definition 1 (narrow sense):** synonym for good or valuable. Opposite of value in the narrow sense is “disvalue.”
  - **Definition 2 (broad sense):** the whole scope of evaluative terms, ranging from the highest good through the indifferent to the worst evil, comprising positive, neutral, as well as negative “values.” Opposite of value in the broad sense is “fact.”

- **Tara Smith’s definition:**
  
  A value is “that which one acts to gain and/or keep.” People act to gain or keep material possessions as well as such things as relationships with others, professional positions, knowledge, opportunities, beliefs, and outlooks. Thus, a house, a friend, a job, or self-esteem could all be values. Insofar as morality is intended to guide a person, however, it seeks to identify those objects that human beings should pursue. Values in this positive sense—things that a person truly should act to require—are united by the fact that they are good for a person. They bring beneficial effects, minor or major, on a person’s life.

  ... Thus, a value is that which one acts to attain.

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4.2. Classification of Value by the Relationship the Value Itself Bears to Others

- **Sources of Value**:
  - **Intrinsic Value**: Something is *intrinsically valuable* if and only if its value is not derived from something else. For this reason, the expression “non-derivative value” could be synonymous with “intrinsic value.” “End value” is another synonym for intrinsic value.
  - **Extrinsic Value**: Something is *extrinsically valuable* if its value is derived from something else. For this reason, the expression “derivative value” could be synonymous with “extrinsic value.” “Means value” is another synonym for extrinsic value.
4.3. Nicholas Rescher’s Classification of Value by the Nature of the Benefit at Issue

Categories of Value

- Material and physical
- Economic
- Moral
- Social
- Political
- Aesthetic
- Religious (spiritual)
- Intellectual
- Professional
- Sentimental
### Table: Category of Value and Sample Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Value</th>
<th>Sample Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material and physical</td>
<td>health, comfort, physical security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>economic security, productiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral</td>
<td>honesty, fairness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>charitableness, courtesy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>freedom, justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic</td>
<td>beauty, symmetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious (spiritual)</td>
<td>piety, clearness of conscience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual</td>
<td>intelligence, clarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>professional recognition and success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sentimental</td>
<td>love, acceptance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nicholas Rescher’s ten categories of values and examples**

### 4.4. What is the Relation of Value to Morality?

Are moral concepts—such as moral right and wrong, virtues and vices—intrinsically valuable? Or are moral concepts extrinsically valuable, i.e., their value derives from “their ability to further nonmoral values, such as pleasure, happiness, health, and political harmony”\(^\text{13}\)?

- According to deontological ethics, “the locus of value is the act or kind of act” and so “certain features of the act itself” have intrinsic value.\(^\text{14}\)
- According to teleological ethics (such as utilitarianism), “the locus of value is the outcome or consequences of act” and so “the ultimate criterion of morality [resides] in some nonmoral value that results from acts.”\(^\text{15}\) In contrast to deontological ethics, teleological ethics denies that that an act has intrinsic value.

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\(^{12}\) Nicholas Rescher, *Introduction to Value Theory*, 16.

\(^{13}\) Pojman 1999, 93.

\(^{14}\) Pojman 1999, 107.

\(^{15}\) Pojman 1999, 107.
5. Religion and Morality

- **Religion and Morality**:
  - **Theistic Metaethics**: The study of the relationship between God and metaethics.
  - **Moral Theology**: Arguments from morality *for* theism.
  - **Moral Atheology**: Arguments from morality *against* theism.
5.1. Theistic Metaethics

- **Moral Theory:**
  - **Theistic Axiology:** The study of the relationship between God and *values*.
  - **Theistic Deontology:** The study of the relationship between God and *duties* or *obligations*. 
5.1.1. Theistic Axiology

- **Theistic Axiology:**
  - **Divine Nature Theory (DNT-A):** Axiological properties are metaphysically grounded in God’s nature (or character).¹⁶ (Lovell)
  - **Divine Command Theory of Moral Values (DCT-A):** Axiological properties are metaphysically grounded in God’s relevant commands.¹⁷ (Mawson)
  - **Divine Theory of Moral Goodness (DT-A):** God himself is the ultimate standard of moral goodness.¹⁸ (Aquinas?, Alston?)
  - **Autonomous Theory of Moral Values (AT-A):** Axiological properties are *not* metaphysically grounded in God or anything dependent on God, such as His nature or commands.
    - **Natural Law Theory (NLT-A):** Moral values are metaphysically grounded in facts about human nature and human flourishing. (Artistotle)

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¹⁶ Lovell 2003.
¹⁷ Mawson 2002. The name for this theory is mine, not Mawson’s.
¹⁸ Aquinas?, Alston 1990; the name for this theory is mine, not Aquinas’s or Alston’s.
### 5.1.2. Theistic Axiology and Euthyphro-Like Dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaethical Theory</th>
<th>Euthyphro-Like Objection</th>
<th>Potential Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DNT-A</td>
<td><em>Euthyphro</em> Dilemma (ED-A): Is God’s nature good simply because it is God’s nature, or is there some independent standard to which God’s nature conforms?</td>
<td><em>All</em> metaethical theories, not just DNT-A, have a stopping point. Why is God’s nature any more problematic than any other stopping point? God Himself (or His nature) is the paradigm of goodness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-A (the unnamed sub-version in which moral values <em>supervene</em> on so-called non-moral, natural properties)</td>
<td>“Are the supervening moral properties—or even moral principles like justice—good simply because they are good, or is there some independent standard of good to which they conform?”</td>
<td><em>All</em> metaethical theories, not just AT-A, have a stopping point. Why are the supervening moral properties any more problematic than any other stopping point? These properties just are the paradigm of goodness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5.1.3. Theistic Deontology

- **Theistic Deontology:**
  - **Divine Command Theory (DCT-D):** Deontological properties are metaphysically grounded in God’s relevant *commands*.\textsuperscript{20} (Ockham)
    - **Modified Divine Command Theory (MDCT-D):** Deontological properties are metaphysically grounded in the relevant commands of a *loving* God.\textsuperscript{21} (Adams)
  - **Divine Will Theory (DWT-D):** a view of deontological properties according to which, for instance, an agent S’s obligation to perform action A in circumstances C is grounded in God’s *will* that S A in C. Divine will theory does not specify which kind of mental state is supposed to ground S’s obligation; it could be God’s desires, beliefs, intentions, or emotions.\textsuperscript{22}
    - **Divine Intention Theory (DIT-D):** Deontological properties are metaphysically grounded in God’s relevant *intentions*.\textsuperscript{23} (Murphy, Quinn)
    - **Divine Motivation Theory (DMT-D):** Deontological properties are metaphysically grounded in God’s relevant *motivations*.\textsuperscript{24} (Zagzebski)

\textsuperscript{20} Ockham.
\textsuperscript{22} Miller 2008.
\textsuperscript{23} Murphy 1998; Quinn 2000, 2002.
\textsuperscript{24} Zagzebski.
- **Divine Desire Theory (DDT-D):** Deontological properties are metaphysically grounded in God’s relevant *desires.*[^25] (Brody, Wierenga, C. Miller)

- **Divine Attitude Theory (DAT-D):** Deontological properties are metaphysically grounded in (and identical to) God’s *attitudes* towards agents (e.g. an action’s moral wrongness consists in its being such that God would be displeased with a person who performs it).[^26] (Jordan)

  - **Autonomous Theory of Right and Wrong (AT-D):** Deontological properties are *not* metaphysically grounded in God’s will, commands, or anything else dependent on God.

  - **Natural Law Theory (NLT-D):** Deontological properties are metaphysically grounded in facts about human nature and human flourishing.

[^26]: Jordan 2009.
### 5.1.4. Theistic Deontology and Euthyphro-Like Dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metaethical Theory</th>
<th>Euthyphro-Like Objection</th>
<th>Potential Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCT-D</td>
<td><em>Euthyphro</em> Dilemma (ED-D): Is something morally obligatory because God commands it, or does God command it because it is obligatory?</td>
<td>(1) No contemporary theistic philosophers endorse DCT-D, so ED-D attacks a straw man. (2) If ED-D is made against MDCT-D (see below), then ED-D is a false dilemma. MDCT-D identifies a third option: God commands something because <em>He is good.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDCT-D</td>
<td>Modified <em>Euthyphro</em> Dilemma (MED-D): Is something morally obligatory because a loving God commands it, or does God command it because it is the loving thing to do?</td>
<td>God commands it because it is the loving thing to do and God’s nature is essentially loving. But so what? The concept of God is the concept of a greatest conceivable being. God just is the standard of moral goodness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2. Moral Theology

5.2.1. Taxonomy of Meta-Ethical Arguments for God’s Existence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Meta-Ethics</th>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Item(s) of Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Morality</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontic Logic</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Linguistics</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Ontology</td>
<td>Robert Adams</td>
<td><em>moral duties</em> (supported with a social theory of obligation)(^{27})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beaty, Fisher, and Nelson (implied)</td>
<td>Objective moral truths are not truths about either natural or nonnatural facts or properties(^{28})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Copan</td>
<td>(1) Human dignity; (2) Human rights; and (3) Human responsibility.(^{29})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W.L. Craig</td>
<td>(1) objective moral <em>values</em>; and (2) objective moral <em>duties</em>.(^{30})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paul Draper</td>
<td>(1) Substantive moral truths do not appear to be necessary truths or groundless contingent truths. (2) They do not appear to supervene on ordinary physical facts. (3) Legal and other non-moral obligations depend for their existence on (human) minds.(^{31})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.S. Lewis</td>
<td>Moral Law (laws require a lawmaker)(^{32})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mark Linville</td>
<td>Humans have a kind of intrinsic dignity or</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Meta-Ethics</th>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Item(s) of Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Mavrodes</td>
<td>The superficiality of morality in a “Russellian” (read: materialistic) world[^34]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J.P. Moreland</td>
<td>(1) Irreducible, nonnatural value properties; (2) Correspondence theory of moral truth; (3) Moral obligations often go against our own best interests[^35]; (4) Intrinsic value of human beings[^36]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hastings Rashdall</td>
<td>Moral law[^37]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>William Sorley</td>
<td>Moral values[^38]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Epistemology</td>
<td>Paul Copan</td>
<td>Moral intuitions[^39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli</td>
<td>Conscience[^40]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C.S. Lewis</td>
<td>Knowledge of the Moral Law[^41]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mark Linville</td>
<td>Warranted moral beliefs[^42]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Psychology</td>
<td>C.S. Lewis</td>
<td>Moral Emotions[^43]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H.P. Owen</td>
<td>Moral reverence, responsibility, and guilt[^44]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^41]: Lewis 1952.
[^42]: Linville 2009.
[^43]: Lewis 1952.
5.2.2. Taxonomy of Other Ethical Arguments about God's Existence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Ethics</th>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Item(s) of Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Descriptive Ethics | Paul Copan  
J.P. Moreland | The existence of God answers the question, “Why should I be moral?”[^45] |
|                   | George Mavrodes | Overriding demands of morality which do not seem to conducive to the good of the person on whom the demands are laid.[^46] |
|                   | C. Stephen Layman | Placing Layman’s argument here is debatable.[^47] |

5.2.3. Not Categorized
- Kant’s practical moral argument[^48]

[^46]: Mavrodes, 580.
5.2.4. William Lane Craig’s Moral Argument

5.2.4.1. Logical Form

(1) If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist.
(2) Objective moral values and duties do exist.
(3) Therefore, God exists.49

5.2.4.2. Characterization of the Argument

• Craig’s argument is about moral ontology, not descriptive ethics, moral epistemology, or moral psychology.
• In Craig’s argument, “objective” means ontological objectivity, not epistemological objectivity.
• When Craig refers to moral values, he has in mind (positive) values like love, generosity, self-sacrifice, equality, mercy, justice, love, and forbearance and (negative) disvalues like selfishness, hatred, abuse, discrimination, and oppression.
• Craig’s argument presupposes a hybrid moral ontology of DNT-A and MDCT-D.

5.2.4.3. Ineffective Replies

• The ‘standard’ version of the Euthyphro dilemma (ED-D) attacks a straw man because the argument does not depend upon the assumption that DCT-D is true. In fact, Craig rejects DCT-D.
• Objections to Biblical morality are irrelevant because the argument isn’t about the Bible. It could be the case both that Biblical morality is objectively false and that God exists.
• The descriptive fact that atheists can be just as moral as theists is irrelevant because the argument is not about descriptive ethics.
• Someone might object by appealing to the semantic facts that (a) morally goodness does not mean identical with God’s nature; and (b) moral duty does not mean “commanded by God.” Such an objection is irrelevant, however, because the argument is not about moral semantics.
• The epistemological fact that atheists can recognize, know, or have justified belief in moral claims is irrelevant because the argument is not about moral epistemology. Explaining moral beliefs as the byproduct of evolution is also irrelevant for the same reason.

5.2.4.3. Assessment

The argument fails because there is no good reason to believe (1). Craig begs the question against both moral anti-reductionism and reductive moral naturalism (see 1.1.1).

49 http://www.reasonablefaith.org/moral-argument
5.2.5. Jordan’s List of Features of Moral Properties

Matthew Carey Jordan has argued that moral properties have five features:\(^5^0^0\)

1. **Objectivity**: The truth of a moral proposition is independent of the beliefs of any particular human being or human community.
2. **Normativity**: Moral considerations, as such, constitute reasons for acting.
3. **Categoricity**: Moral reasons are reasons for all human persons, regardless of what goals or desires they may have.
4. **Authority**: Moral reasons are especially weighty reasons.
5. **Knowability**: In normal circumstances, adult human beings have epistemic access to morally salient considerations.

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5.3. Moral Atheology

5.3.1. Taxonomy of Meta-Ethical Arguments against God’s Existence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Meta-Ethics</th>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Item(s) of Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitions of Morality</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deontic Logic</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Linguistics</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Ontology</td>
<td>Graham Oppy</td>
<td>(Hypothetical) Falsity of moral realism&lt;sup&gt;51&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Epistemology</td>
<td>Niclas Berggren</td>
<td>First-order ethical disagreement (i.e., disagreement about specific topics in applied ethics, such as abortion, capital punishment, homosexuality, animal rights, protecting the environment, etc.)&lt;sup&gt;52&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Psychology</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.2. Taxonomy of Other Ethical Arguments against God’s Existence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Ethics</th>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Item(s) of Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative Ethics</td>
<td>Stephen Maitzen</td>
<td>The ordinary and fundamental moral obligation to prevent easily preventable, horrific suffering by an innocent person.&lt;sup&gt;53&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive Ethics</td>
<td>Paul Draper</td>
<td>Meager moral fruits of theistic belief&lt;sup&gt;54&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stephen Maitzen</td>
<td>The existence of God would undermine the main basis of our duty to act compassionately.&lt;sup&gt;55&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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5.3.3. Not Categorized

- James Rachels’ and Scott Aikins’ arguments against the possibility of a being worthy of worship.\(^{56}\)
- Raymond Bradley’s “moral argument for atheism.”\(^{57}\)

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### 6. Other Related Issues Which Are (Arguably) Not Part of Ethics Proper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Sub-Topic</th>
<th>(Alleged) Relationship to Ethics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moral Agency</td>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>I have placed this issue here in section 5 since this (arguably) seems to be an argument from consciousness, not a moral argument <em>per se.</em></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Some philosophers have argued that, even if ethics is autonomous (in the sense that both AT-A and AT-D are true), it is odd that humans are under an obligation to an autonomous moral realm <em>which is causally inert.</em> For example, Craig argues:</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>It is almost as though the moral realm knew we were coming. It is far more plausible to regard both the natural realm and the moral realm as under the hegemony of a divine creator and lawgiver than to think that these entirely independent orders of reality just happened to mesh.(^\text{58})</td>
</tr>
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<td>Thus, Craig argues, theism offers a a <em>single</em> hypothesis to explain facts about both morality and human persons, in contrast to metaphysical naturalism or atheism which would need to appeal to <em>multiple</em> hypotheses (such as moral anti-reductionism to explain the moral realm and multiple scientific theories to explain embodied persons in the natural realm).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Agency</td>
<td>Libertarian or Contra-Causal Free Will</td>
<td>Many philosophers have argued that moral responsibility and accountability requires libertarian or contra-causal free will.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Appendix A. Bibliography

The purpose of this bibliography is to provide a comprehensive list of all academic articles published on the relationship between religion and morality. This bibliography is something I have been compiling for years; I still consider it a work in progress.

If you spot any errors, omissions, or other edits required, please post a comment and I will update the bibliography accordingly.

Note: an asterisk (*) indicates an item which I consider particularly good. No inferences at all should be made about the absence of an asterisk before an item, since some of these items I have not yet even read.


A Primer in Religion and Morality


—. “A Law Requires a Lawgiver,” under submission.


A Primer in Religion and Morality


Prager, Dennis and Jonathan Glover. *Can We Be Good without God?* (transcript of debate held at Oxford University on March 3, 1993).


—. “Ethics and the Bible.” *Think* Issue 1, Spring 2002.


—. “Facts and Values.” *Philosophical Topics* 14:2, Fall 1986: 5-31.


—. “Morbility Requires God ... or Does It?” *Free Inquiry* 17 (Spring 1997): 32-34.


